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This article assesses whether the scholarly literature on radicalisation is
adequately integrated into national policy strategies for countering violent
extremism (CVE). It outlines concepts and models of radicalisation, and offers a
framework for understanding its various complex causes. The article then
compares this scholarly research against case studies of CVE policy from the
United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands. These
countries’ policies adequately capture the core nature of radicalisation, but
otherwise exhibit significant variation in how they explain its causes. This can be
explained partly by a lack of clarity over how and why radicalisation happens.
However, it also suggests that CVE policy is often shaped less by evidence-based
research, and more by cultural, political and historical factors. This confirms a
need for evidence-based approaches to CVE, and for deeper comparative studies
of how radicalisation is understood across national contexts.
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I. Introduction
There are many different explanations as to what radicalisation is and how and why people
radicalise. At its core, radicalisation is a process in which a person adopts extremist views and
moves towards committing a violent act. Models describing the process of radicalisation
differ on how many steps or stages are involved in the progression towards violence (Gill,
2007; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2007, 2004; Taarnby,
2005). Common metaphors describe it as a ‘staircase’ (Moghaddam, 2005) or ‘pathway’ (Gill,

1

Corresponding Author Contact: Keiran Hardy, Email: k.hardy@griffith.edu.au, School of Criminology and
Criminal Justice, Griffith University Gold Coast Campus, Southport QLD 4215

76
Keiran Hardy: Comparing Theories of Radicalisation with Countering Violent Extremism
Policy

2007) to terrorism, though scholars are increasingly moving away from linear models (Jensen,
Atwell Seate, & James, 2018; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010).
The causes of radicalisation are typically explained through a variety of perspectives
that emphasise psychological, economic and other factors (Christmann, 2012; Hafez and
Mullins, 2015; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015; Senzai, 2015). A growing number of empirical studies
test the relevance of these factors by drawing on strain theory, social movement theory and
other frameworks (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, 2008a; LaFree, Jensen, James & SaferLichtenstein, 2018; Nivette, Eisner & Ribeaud, 2017; Pederson, Vestel, & Bakken, 2018).
Radicalisation remains a complex field, with no single profile for identifying who is likely to
radicalise, or when they will progress to committing a violent act (Borum, 2015; Desmarais et
al., 2017; Horgan, 2008, 2014; Silke, 1998).
The complexity of these reasons makes it difficult for governments to design
appropriate policy responses to terrorism. Strategies for countering violent extremism (CVE)
have become a core component of national counter-terrorism policy. These national policy
documents shape CVE programs on the ground, which involve police working with
communities, health services, government agencies and private companies (Beutel &
Weinberger, 2016) to address the risks of extremism and radicalisation. CVE programs
include efforts to address radicalisation directly through prison deradicalisation programs and
multi-agency interventions for youth at risk of radicalisation. Many CVE programs also
include primary prevention efforts directed at a wider population (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle &
Zammit, 2016).
This article begins by assessing the current state of the literature on radicalisation.
Radicalisation research is constantly developing, so it is useful to periodically take stock of
the field. Part Two analyses different concepts and models of radicalisation, including its
relationship to extremism. Part Three offers a framework for understanding the complex
causes involved in this process. These causes are grouped into ideological, psychological,
social, political, economic and technological factors. Part Three assesses briefly the weight of
the available evidence as to how important these factors are in causing radicalisation.
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Part Four explains the data sources and methods, and Part Five assesses the extent to
which the scholarly research is integrated in Western CVE policy strategies. Part Five draws
on case studies from the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Denmark, Sweden and The
Netherlands. It is based in a qualitative content analysis of national CVE and counterterrorism policy documents.
The main contribution of this article is to marry radicalisation research with an
analysis of CVE policy. It offers a framework for understanding the causes of radicalisation
which can be used to assess which explanation governments favour in their respective CVE
policies. This contributes to deeper comparative analysis of national approaches to CVE.
The article also aims to contribute to greater consistency in how governments
understand radicalisation, and a greater reliance on evidence-based approaches. While people
radicalise for complex and diverse reasons, there should not be any significant inconsistencies
in how governments understand and model that process. Western governments should also
maintain compatible explanations of radicalisation so that they can cooperate effectively when
countering that threat across national borders.
The following analysis demonstrates that CVE policies adequately capture the core
nature of radicalisation, but otherwise exhibit significant variation in how they explain its
causes. This is partly due to ongoing uncertainty over what radicalisation is and how it should
be modelled. However, it also suggests that CVE policy is often shaped less by evidencebased research, and more so by political, cultural and historical factors that are specific to
each national government. This suggests a need for greater consistency across Western
approaches to CVE, and for deeper comparative studies of how radicalisation is understood
across national contexts.

II. What is Radicalisation?

Similar to never-ending debates about what constitutes terrorism (Blackbourn, Davis &
Taylor, 2013; Hardy & Williams, 2011), there is no single agreed definition of radicalisation.
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In a general sense, radicalisation is a process by which an individual moves towards
committing a violent act based on extremist views. At the ‘most basic level, according to
Neumann (2013: 874), ‘radicalization can be defined as the process whereby people become
extremist’.
But what constitutes an ‘extremist’ view? Is it any idea or opinion that is contrary to a
society’s core values, or does it need to be based in a coherent and recognised ideology? Does
it need to justify or encourage the use of violence? Does it need to be religious or political?
The answers to these questions are unclear but important: by declaring that someone has
radicalised, or is at risk of radicalisation, we are implying that they are progressing on a
pathway towards terrorism. This triggers more state responses and comes with many more
connotations than saying that a person has progressed towards criminal conduct of another
kind. We are also implying that the person has moved beyond a form of legitimate speech or
political protest (even violent protest) to something morally unjustifiable.
To warrant state intervention, extremist views should justify, encourage or at the very
least condone the use of violence to achieve some significant political or religious change.
Ideas and opinions that are contrary to a society’s core values but create no risk of harm
should be supported as part of a healthy, functioning democracy that values freedom of
expression. This might seem an obvious dividing line, but the relationship between
extremism, violence and free speech remains uncertain. As explained further below, the UK’s
Prevent strategy continues to target non-violent ideas (Home Office, 2009, 2011; Lowe,
2017).
Some of this confusion stems from using the words ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ to describe
ideas and systems that are not in any way related to terrorism (Neumann, 2013). One can
propose radical reforms to tax policy, for example, or take an ‘extreme’ approach to dieting
and exercise. Other ideas – like women’s suffrage – were considered ‘radical’ in a particular
historical context, but ended up overcoming discrimination and achieving greater equality.
An important distinction is often drawn between ‘cognitive’ radicalisation, which
focuses on extremist beliefs, and ‘behavioural’ radicalisation, which focuses on extremist
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behaviour (Neumann, 2013). This gets at the question: has somebody radicalised once they
adopt and internalise extremist views, or only if they engage in some criminal conduct (such
as training for terrorism) as a result? From a public policy perspective, extremist behaviour
would appear to be the primary concern, but the development of extremist views is also
clearly relevant. In most Western countries there are criminal offences targeting extremist
behaviour, including preparatory and ancillary conduct like recruitment for terrorist
organisations and collecting terrorist documents (McDonald & Carlile, 2014; Tulich, 2012).
The important question for CVE policy, on the other hand, is how best to deal with people
who are at risk of engaging in such behaviour – particularly young people who are not yet of
the age of criminal responsibility. CVE programs also address the risks of radicalisation in a
wider population through primary prevention measures (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammitt,
2016).
There is little agreement, then, on how extremism and radicalisation should be
defined, whether these are necessarily linked to terrorist behaviour, and at what point in the
process it is appropriate for governments to intervene. One thing that scholars typically agree
on is that radicalisation is a process, either more or less gradual. This process has been
modelled in different ways. The ‘end-point’ of this process differs depending on whether the
model favours a cognitive or behavioural approach (Neumann, 2013: 874). The number and
type of steps involved also varies across different models. However, scholars typically agree
that there are recognisable stages, and that a person ‘does not become radical overnight’
(Christmann, 2012: 10).
The well-known ‘NYPD Model’ involves four stages: pre-radicalisation, selfidentification through an early exploration of Salafi Islamism, indoctrination through the
adoption of Jihadi-Salafi ideology, and jihadisation by accepting the duty to participate in
militant action (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Sageman (2004, 2007) also describes four stages: a
sense of moral outrage, developing a specific worldview, resonating that worldview with
personal experiences, and mobilising through interactive networks. Gill’s (2007) ‘pathway’
model also has four: exposure to propaganda, the experience of a ‘catalyst’ event, pre-existing
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social ties which facilitate recruitment, and in-group radicalisation. Mogghadam’s (2005)
Staircase model describes six steps, beginning on the ‘ground floor’ with psychological
interpretation of injustice, then ascending through greater moral engagement and categorical
thinking towards an ultimate violent act.
Other models set out eight or more steps (Taarnby, 2005), or do away with a linear,
graduated approach altogether (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Koehler, 2017; McCauley &
Moskalenko, 2008). Increasingly, scholars are moving away from a linear approach towards
behavioural, relational and multi-causal models (Della Porta, 2018; Jensen, Atwell Seate, &
James, 2018; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). Others usefully
condense the various frameworks into a single conceptual model. Koehler (2017), for
example, offers a theory of ‘de-pluralisation’. He describes violent radical ideologies as those
which involve some ‘praised future vision’ (Koehler, 2017: 75). The gradual adoption of a
violent radical ideology leads to the person’s worldview being ‘gradually rewritten,
restructured and redefined’ (Koehler, 2017: 75). Through this process, the person’s
‘understanding of core political concepts and values has dramatically changed’ (Koehler,
2017: 75). Violence may then become the only option to resolve the resulting psychological
tension.
Hafez and Mullins (2015) also neatly capture the core nature of radicalisation. They
define it as ‘(1) a gradual “process” that entails socialization into an (2) extremist belief
system that sets the stage for (3) violence even if it does not make it inevitable’ (Hafez &
Mullins, 2015: 960). Radicalisation ‘involves adopting an extremist worldview, one that is
rejected by mainstream society and one that deems legitimate the use of violence as a method
to effect societal or political change’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 960).
The complexity and divergence in these accounts suggests there is little likelihood of
scholars reaching a consensus over how radicalisation should be modelled. However, there is
some common ground. Each model describes a person who internalises and strengthens their
association with an extremist ideology. This internal process is influenced heavily by external
connections to terrorist groups and networks. This is not necessarily a linear process, but
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graduated models help us understand an individual’s progression towards violence. As this
process culminates, the individual may commit a violent act.

III. Causes of Radicalisation

The models above describe the how of radicalisation, but not the why. The reasons why an
individual radicalises remain diverse and complex (Campelo et al., 2018; Desmarais et al.
2017; Sieckelinck & Gielen, 2018). Despite significant scholarly efforts, they cannot be
reduced to a single psychological profile to identify who is at risk of radicalisation (Horgan,
2008, 2014; Silke, 1998). Below, these various reasons are grouped into a framework
describing ideological, psychological, social, political, economic and technological factors.
These factors are not competing alternatives; rather, they are each part of the ‘radicalisation
puzzle’ (Hafez and Mullins, 2015).
These are also not pure types. There is overlap, for example, between political
grievances, ideology and psychological factors. Political grievances can be a core tenet of an
extremist ideology, and an individual may feel anger or frustration over these, leading them to
violent action (McCauley & Maskalenko, 2008). However, the categories set out below are
useful for understanding the dominant causes of radicalisation, and for later assessing how
governments explain radicalisation through their national CVE policies.
Technology is more commonly considered an ‘enabler’ than a cause of radicalisation
(Christmann, 2012; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). However, Islamic State
has been highly successful in using social media to recruit new members and encourage lonewolf attacks around the world (Bertram, 2016; Greenberg, 2016; Klausen, 2015; McDowellSmith, Speckhard, & Yayla, 2017). Given these recent developments, it is increasingly
appropriate to consider the influence of technology on its own terms. The impact of
technology remains unclear (Conway, 2017; Koehler, 2014), but this might now be
considered one of the many reasons why people radicalise, and not merely as a medium which
facilitates radicalisation.
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a. Ideological
It might seem obvious, even ‘tautological’ (Guhl, 2018: 192) to say that terrorism is
based on an extremist ideology. Cognitive radicalisation depends upon the idea that a person
internalises extremist ideas on their path towards violent action.
Clearly, many terrorist organisations encourage violent attacks based on a
fundamentalist and erroneous interpretation of Islam. This comprises more specific ideas,
including that ‘Western societies are morally bankrupt’, that ‘the West is engaged in a war
against Muslims’, and that ‘jihad and martyrdom are indeed legitimate means by which
Muslims defend their faith’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 967). Together these ideas constitute an
ideology because they describe a ‘master narrative about the world and one’s place in it’
(Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 961). Ideologies typically ‘demonize enemies and justify violence
against them, and they incentivize sacrifice by promising heroic redemption’ (Hafez &
Mullins, 2015: 961). For Neumann (2013: 880), terrorism cannot be explained without
reference to these ideological assumptions, because otherwise ‘none of the behaviours make
any sense’. Hoffman (2006: 82) believes that the ‘religious imperative for terrorism is the
most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today’.
Despite the seemingly obvious connection between ideology and terrorism, the causal
link remains unclear (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Christmann, 2012; Guhl, 2018; Hafez &
Mullins, 2015; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018). There are two main angles to this argument. The
first is that group dynamics are considered to have a greater impact than ideology (Guhl,
2018; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). The importance of groups and networks is addressed further
below. However, even if further studies continue to confirm this, it does not discount the
important role that ideology can play in allowing group leaders to influence younger recruits.
A second argument is that there is no necessary connection between religion and
terrorism because terrorist organisations rely on a distorted interpretation of Islam.
Radicalisation is difficult and problematic to explain through an ideological lens because only
a small percentage of Muslims become violent extremists (Abbas, 2007; Githens-Mazer,
2008). This is certainly true, but the argument is only partly convincing: the ideology in
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question is not Islam (as a religion), but rather the fundamentalist version of it relied upon by
terrorist groups.
There are more convincing reasons to believe that the link between ideology and
terrorism is uncertain. First, many individuals who internalise a radical ideology do not
progress to committing a violent act (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018).
Second, many terrorists are not devoutly religious; indeed, many have had only minimal
exposure to extremist ideology before committing acts of violence (Cottee, 2017; Guhl,
2018). For example, two British men jailed for travelling to Syria purchased copies of Islam
for Dummies and The Qur’an for Dummies before leaving to fight with Islamic State (Cottee,
2017). Finally, there are significant historical and geo-political reasons why al-Qaeda, Islamic
State and other terrorist groups have called for attacks against Western interests. Key among
these is the involvement of the United States and its Allies in the Middle East (Christmann,
2012; English, 2016; Hoffman, 2006). This suggests that ideology is an important factor in
facilitating recruitment, but not the major cause of terrorism. The connection between
ideology and terrorism remains ‘easy to see but difficult to explain’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015:
967).

b. Psychological
There is no recognised pathology, medical condition or single psychological profile
that explains why some people become terrorists (Horgan, 2008, 2014; Silke, 1998).
However, psychological factors still contribute to radicalisation. The strongest among these
are a lack of self-esteem and sense of identity, which result in the need to join a cause and feel
valued by others. These needs have been described as a ‘quest for significance’ (Kruglanski et
al., 2014) and a ‘search for identity contributing to a sense of belonging, worth and purpose’
(Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b: 7). According to Silverman (2017), travelling to Syria to fight with
Islamic State became a ‘coming of age’ story in which many young men aimed to achieve
personal fulfilment.
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This search for identity is not sufficient in itself to explain terrorist behaviour: clearly
the vast majority of young people who lack self-esteem do not become terrorists. However, it
is consistently recognised as one of the most important factors, alongside group dynamics,
which has allowed Islamic State and other terrorist groups to be so successful in recruiting
young members from across the globe (Borum & Fein, 2017; Chassman, 2016; Christmann,
2012; Dawson & Amarasingam, 2017; Lindekilde, Bertelsen, & Stohl, 2016; Senzai, 2015).

c. Social
Another consistent finding is that social relationships are crucial to understanding
radicalisation (Christmann, 2012; Della Porta, 2018; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Maskaliūnaite,
2015; McCauley & Maskalenko, 2008; Stern, 2016). This is relevant not only to Islamist
terrorism, but also left-wing and right-wing terrorism, cult membership, and gangs (Hafez &
Mullins, 2015). Radicalisation is a ‘group phenomenon’ in which friends, relatives and topdown recruitment processes encourage new members to internalise a group’s common
mindset (Christmann, 2012: 27). The influence exerted on new members can range from
persuasion to manipulation and coercion (McCauley & Maskalenko, 2008; Maskaliūnaite,
2015). A number of processes facilitate this, including ‘group bonding, group polarisation and
isolation, and peer pressure’ (Christmann, 2012: 27).
There are two main reasons why group dynamics have a significant influence on
radicalisation. The first is that groups satisfy (and are able to exploit) the psychological need,
particularly of young recruits, to find a sense of meaning and purpose. Membership of a group
and participation in its activities satisfies the psychological ‘quest for significance’
(Kruglanski et al., 2014). The second reason is that groups amplify the costs of leaving once
an individual has joined. Even if an individual loses faith in the group’s ideology, strategic or
tactics, they cannot easily exit. There will be feelings of loyalty, guilt, and anxiety about
returning to a previous ‘normal’ life (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). There may also be fear of
criminal sanction by the state or punishment by the group itself. In other words, the
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‘emotional, psychological, material, and physical costs of exit can be prohibitively high to
those seeking to walk away from extremists’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 965).

d. Political
There is ongoing disagreement over the influence that political grievances have on
radicalisation. Key among these grievances is a sense of injustice over Western involvement
in the Middle East – particularly the invasion of Iraq. Hafez and Mullins (2015: 962) ‘do not
find compelling any argument’ that these kinds of grievances play a causal role in behavioral
radicalization. Maskaliūnaite (2015: 19), on the other hand, argues that ‘perceived injustice’ is
one of the ‘strongest motivators’ to join a violent group. Other reports and survey data
confirm that grievances are ‘key explanatory factors driving radicalisation’, especially those
concerning Western foreign policy (Christmann, 2012: 26).
Political grievances are insufficient to explain why some people join extremist groups
and not others. However, their importance should not be understated. To begin with, political
grievances cannot be neatly separated from ideological concerns about the West being
‘morally bankrupt’ and ‘at war with Islam’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). Terrorist groups
routinely use political and geo-political reasons as part of the ideology justifying their actions.
This dates back well before 9/11. A major grievance underlying bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa was
the close military relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US (English, 2016; Hoffman,
2006). This led to attacks, prior to 9/11, against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and
the USS Cole in Aden. Each of these attacks was designed to make the United States
withdraw its troops from the Middle East. When that did not happen, the US homeland
became al-Qaeda’s target.
Even Islamic State (IS), which maintains a more apocalyptic version of Salafi
Jihadism than al-Qaeda, has significant geo-political reasons for its actions. After coming
declaring its Caliphate, IS dismantled the physical boundary separating Iraq and Syria. That
boundary was imposed by the French and British governments under the Sykes-Picot
Agreement that followed World War One (Sengupta, 2015). It is unlikely that these geo86
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political grievances play a significant role in causing a young individual halfway across the
globe to commit an act of terrorism. However, political grievances provide an important
backdrop under which terrorist organisations are able to recruit more members and encourage
further attacks.

e. Economic
Many recent terrorist attacks have been committed by well-educated, middle class
offenders (Porter & Kebbell, 2011; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Smith & Nolan, 2016). There is
therefore no necessary connection between low socio-economic status and a risk of terrorism.
Empirical studies have also rejected the suggestion that countries which experience higher
levels of poverty experience higher levels of terrorism (Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2011).
However, socio-economic disadvantage can play a causal role in radicalisation by
aggravating perceptions of injustice. This is captured in the theory of ‘relative deprivation’,
meaning that a person is aware that others have better material conditions or higher social
status in comparison to them, and the person perceives these differences to be unjust
(Christmann, 2012). Relative deprivation can operate on an individual, group or international
level (Christmann, 2012).
Economic disparity is therefore also relevant, and may facilitate radicalisation if
combined with personal experience of discrimination. According to Hafez and Mullins (2015:
962), many Muslim communities in Europe experience isolation and discrimination, and this
can contribute to higher levels of criminality:

At the risk of overly generalizing, one can point to several developments that have
contributed to Muslim disenchantment with their European host societies. These
include poor socioeconomic status due to unemployment rates that are consistently
higher than the national averages. Although the Muslim population of Europe contains
many educated middle class professionals and wealthy individuals, this is not the case
for the majority of the population that occupies the lower end of the socioeconomic
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scale. Unemployment combines with residential discrimination and segregation to
produce ethnically homogenous neighborhoods that are mostly dilapidated. High
levels of residential concentration and poor housing conditions contribute to higher
levels of criminality. Unemployment, poverty, and crime, in turn, produce the usual
stereotypes concerning the “uncivilized” foreigners.
Other studies confirm a link between minority discrimination and extremism. One study of
over 2,500 Muslims residing in Europe and the US found that perceived discrimination
towards Muslims was significantly associated with the belief that suicide bombing is justified
(Victoroff, Adelman, & Matthews, 2012). Another study of 172 countries found a strong link
between economic discrimination against minority groups and an increased risk of terrorism
(Piazza, 2011).
f. Technological
Finally, technology is increasingly seen as important factor contributing to
radicalisation. Islamic State has been hugely successful in recruiting young fighters from
around the globe by posting slick propaganda videos on YouTube, Twitter and Facebook
(Greenberg, 2016; Klausen, 2015; McDowell-Smith, Speckhard, & Yayla, 2017). As
Greenberg (2016: 166) explains, this strategy ‘speaks directly to the youth it is targeting for
recruitment, using the medium that works best for these youth’.
Islamic State’s global reach would not have been possible without the Internet.
However, the causal link between viewing extremist material on the Internet and
radicalisation remains unclear. It is more common for individuals to view extremist material
online while being radicalised through group networks and social relationships. It is less
common for them to ‘self-radicalise’ purely through exposure to extremist material online,
without any human connection (Stevens & Neumann, 2009). As Conway (2016: 77) explains,
there is ‘no yet proven connection between consumption of and networking around violent
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extremist online content and adoption of extremist ideology and/or engagement in violent
extremism and terrorism’.

g. Summary
There is no single definition or model of radicalisation, and its causes are various and
complex. However, there are sufficient common themes across the literature to draw some
general observations. Radicalisation is a gradual though not necessarily linear process in
which a person internalises and strengthens their association with an extremist ideology while
moving towards violent action. Extremist ideas are those which justify the use of violence to
achieve political or religious change. This process is influenced heavily by external groups
and networks.
The reasons why people embark on this process are complex. They are not reducible
to a singular psychological or economic profile, though some factors have greater impact than
others. These factors and an assessment of the current state of the literature are summarised in
Table 1. Young people who lack self-esteem and a strong sense of identity can be more easily
persuaded, manipulated or coerced by terrorist groups to adopt an extremist ideology.
Political grievances (including anger about Western involvement in the Middle East) and
economic disparity (where combined with discrimination against minority communities)
provide important context. Technology increases the risks of radicalisation by allowing
terrorist groups to communicate their propaganda globally and speak directly to a younger
audience.
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Table 1. Causes of Radicalisation
Factors

Influence on Radicalisation

Ideological

Core to understanding terrorist propaganda, but the impact of
ideology on radicalisation remains difficult to establish because
many radicals are not violent, many terrorists are not devoutly
religious, and terrorist organisations have strategic aims.

Psychological

Cannot be reduced to a single profile or pathology but a lack of
self-esteem and sense of identity are key to understanding why
young people are drawn to terrorist organisations

Social

A key contributing factor which allows terrorist groups and
networks to manipulate, persuade or coerce individuals into
adopting an extremist ideology

Political

A sense of injustice over Western involvement in the Middle
East provides important context and remains an important
aspect of terrorist recruitment and propaganda

Economic

Terrorism is not linked to poverty or low socio-economic status,
but economic disparity can influence radicalisation where
combined with a personal experience of minority discrimination

Technological

The influence of technology on behavioural radicalisation
remains unclear, but the Internet and social media allow terrorist
organisations to have global reach and speak to a younger
audience
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IV. Methods and Sources

The analysis below compares this scholarly research on radicalisation with Western CVE
policy. Part Five draws on case studies of CVE policy in the UK, Australia, Denmark,
Sweden and The Netherlands. The main data sources for each case study are the CVE policy
documents published by each national government (Home Office, 2011, 2015; Australian
Government, 2015; Government of Denmark, 2016; Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014; Ministry of
Security and Justice, 2014), and, where available, each government’s national counterterrorism strategy (Council of Australian Governments, 2015; Home Office, 2018; Löfven &
Ygeman, 2014; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2016). The analysis
focuses on current policy, though previous policies have been included where they explain
key elements of the current policy, mark significant changes in that policy over time, or fill
gaps in how radicalisation is currently explained (Government of Denmark, 2009, 2014;
Home Office, 2009; Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007).
The case study countries have been selected on the basis that they exhibit core
similarities and important differences. The countries have similar political, legal and
democratic traditions and have recently published counter-terrorism policy in response to
Islamic State in a broadly similar format. Sweden’s counter-terrorism strategy, for example,
comprises three strands (‘Prevent’, ‘Preempt’ and ‘Protect’) (Löfven & Ygeman, 2014),
which directly mirror those found in the UK’s CONTEST strategy (Home Office, 2018). The
countries all face an ongoing serious threat of terrorism related to returning foreign fighters
and related homegrown terrorism.
At the same time, each country has a different experience with terrorism and counterterrorism, which allows for fruitful comparison. The UK’s long history of responding to
terrorism in the colonies and Northern Ireland (Newsinger, 2015) contrasts with Sweden’s
experience of responding to right-wing extremism (Bjørgo, 1993), and with the comparatively
limited experience of the remaining countries. The UK has experienced a series of serious
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recent attacks, while Sweden, Australia and Denmark have experienced some recent attacks
on a smaller scale.
These countries also have contrasting experiences with CVE. The UK’s experience
with Prevent has been longstanding but highly problematic (Briggs, 2010; Lakhani, 2012).
Denmark has been praised for its innovative approaches to offender reintegration (Young et
al., 2016). The Netherlands’ approach has focused to a greater extent on integration and has
developed over time from a community-based strategy to a national approach (Koehler, 2017:
248). Australia has invested much less in CVE, devoting most of its resources to coercive
legal responses to terrorism (Hardy & Williams, 2016). It has looked closely to the UK in
designing its own counter-terrorism laws and policy (Roach, 2006), but a key difference is
that Australia remains the only democratic nation without national human rights protection
(Williams, 2007). This has allowed the Australian Parliament to enact some of the world’s
most extraordinary legal responses to terrorism (Hardy & Williams, 2016).
Part Five presents the results of a qualitative study into these countries’ national CVE
and counter-terrorism policies. The core aim of this study was to assess the extent to which
these policy documents accurately reflect the current scholarly research on radicalisation.
Three research questions shaped the analysis, and the policy documents were coded according
to themes identified in the literature review above. First, how do these countries define
radicalisation and extremism in their CVE policy? Second, how do these countries explain the
causes of radicalisation, and which factor(s) do they consider to be the most important?
Finally, do their policies explain radicalisation in ways that are consistent or at least broadly
compatible?
Balancing diversity and consistency across CVE policy remains a difficult challenge.
On the one hand, some variation in these policies should be expected and encouraged. There
may well be cultural, political and historical reasons why these countries approach CVE and
explain radicalisation in different ways (some of these are addressed below). Individuals will
radicalise for reasons that are specific to their local context. The UK’s experience with
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Prevent demonstrates that CVE programs should be designed with local needs in mind
(Briggs, 2010; Lakhani, 2012).
At the same time, it is reasonable to expect that these countries should explain
radicalisation in ways that are broadly consistent and compatible. Each country faces a similar
type of threat: of ‘foreign fighters’ who have travelled to Iraq and Syria, and related
homegrown terrorism. These threats are based on the same al-Qaeda-inspired ideology,
disseminated through the Islamic State’s sophisticated propaganda machine. Their foreign
fighters have travelled to the same conflict zones to fight with the same terrorist organisation,
and returned home to countries with similar democratic, legal and political systems. There is
no significant practical reason why one country should explain radicalisation primarily
through an ideological lens, for example, and another to define it as a social or psychological
phenomenon. To the extent that the scholarly research identifies recurring themes in how and
why people radicalise, CVE programs should model that process in at least broadly similar
ways. There is also a need for Western governments to maintain consistent (or at least
compatible) explanations of radicalisation so they can cooperate effectively when countering
the global threat.
The analysis below represents an initial exploration of how well the current scholarly
research is integrated into Western CVE policy, and an initial comparative study of how these
countries explain radicalisation and extremism. There remains a need for deeper and more
extensive comparisons of how radicalisation is understood across different national contexts.
There is also a need for further academic debate on the extent to which CVE policy and
programs should be consistently designed.

V. Countering Violent Extremism Policy

How, then, do these countries understand and model the radicalisation process in their
national CVE policy? Are their approaches in line with the scholarly research? And do they
offer consistent explanations of its causes?
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Each country’s policy adequately captures the core nature of radicalisation – as a
complex process in which a person gradually adopts an extremist ideology. These policy
definitions of radicalisation are set out in Table 2.

Table 2. Definitions of radicalisation in national CVE policy.
Country

Policy Definition of Radicalisation

United Kingdom

‘Radicalisation refers to the process by which a
person comes to support terrorism and forms of
extremism leading to terrorism’ (Home Office, 2011:
108).

Australia

‘Radicalisation is a complex process that can occur
for people across a diverse range of ethnic, national,
political and religious groups. The process involves a
series of decisions which, in certain circumstances
will end in an act of violent extremism’ (Australian
Government, 2015: 4)

Denmark

‘Radicalisation refers to a short- or long-term process
where persons subscribe to extremist views or
legitimise their actions on the basis of extremist
ideologies’ (Government of Denmark, 2016: 7).

Sweden

‘Those who commit ideologically motivated acts for
political or religious reasons have gone through a
process in which they have gradually come to adopt a
violent ideology or accept violence as a legitimate
method which the scope of a political or religious
ideology. This process is called radicalisation’
(Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014).

Netherlands

‘Radicalisation is a process that involves an
increasing willingness to accept and act – perhaps
violently – on even the most extreme implications of
an ideology. Radicalisation can also be seen as the
process by which individuals move from lawful
activism towards extremism and, subsequently,
terrorism’ (National Coordinator for Security and
Counterterrorism, 2014: 6).
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The Netherlands’ current definition is significantly narrower than that found in its
earlier action plan (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007). That earlier policy
defined radicalisation as the ‘willingness to strive for far-reaching changes in society
(possibly in an undemocratic manner), to support such changes or persuade others to accept
them’ (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007: 5). This captured a far greater
range of conduct, and could have plausibly included political protest, industrial action and
other legitimate dissent. Defining radicalisation as an ‘attitude’ (Ministry of Security and
Justice, 2014: 33) also failed to capture the complex, gradual nature of the process. It
suggested instead that a simple change in perspective would be sufficient for a person to
radicalise.
With the exception of the UK, these policies also adequately capture the core nature of
extremism and relate it consistently to the possibility of violent action. Australia targets
violent extremism, which is said to be present ‘where a person or group decides that fear,
terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and then
acts on these beliefs’ (Australian Government, 2015: 10). Sweden describes the adoption of a
violent ideology, meaning that a person ‘accepts violence and sometimes also that they
commit ideologically motivated crimes’ (Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014: 16). Denmark targets
‘extremism’ rather than violent extremism, but defines extremism by reference to legitimising
violence (Government of Denmark, 2016: 7). The Netherlands now links extremism to
‘breaking the law and executing (violent) illegal actions (Ministry of Security and Justice,
2014: 31). These approaches are, in other words, focused on behavioural radicalisation – or at
least the risk of a violent act as the end-point of the process.
Beyond these core similarities, there are important differences. The UK is a significant
outlier in defining the scope of its Prevent strategy in very broad terms. Since 2009, the UK
government (Home Office, 2009) has defined extremism to include non-violent ideas. This
means views and opinions which involve ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British
values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and
tolerance for different faiths and beliefs’ (Home Office, 2011: 107). In other words, the scope
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of Prevent clearly extends to cognitive radicalisation. This targets a much broader range of
speech and opinions than would ordinarily be of concern to police and security services. As a
result, it has raised significant concerns over free speech and discrimination against Britain’s
Muslim communities (Briggs, 2010; Dudenhoefer, 2018; Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010;
Lakhani, 2012; Lowe, 2017).
There are also important differences in the weight given to different causes of
radicalisation. Each country recognises there are multiple contributing factors, but there is
significant variation in which cause is viewed as the primary driver. The current Danish
strategy offers little explanation of why people radicalise, but its earlier action plan focused
on the psychological search for identity (Government of Denmark, 2009: 8). The Netherlands
also identifies psychological factors as being important, but its policies have focused
consistently on a lack of integration and the polarization of ethnic communities (Ministry of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007). Australia’s strategy focuses equally on three main
elements, being ideology, social networks and prior criminal behavior (Australian
Government, 2015: 8). Sweden focuses on propaganda and the Internet, as well as ideology
and political grievances (Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014). Sweden is arguably alone in focusing on
the role of grievances, including a sense of injustice generated by Islamophobia and military
interventions (Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014: 15). These dominant policy explanations of why
people radicalise are summarised in Table 3.
The UK is an outlier in giving the greatest weight to ideological factors. The first
objective of Prevent is to counter ideology, and the other causes of radicalisation relate back
to this primary goal. Rather than being significant causes on their own terms, psychological
and social factors are said to influence radicalisation by making extremist ideology more
attractive:

We judge that radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of
violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal
vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that
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ideology seem both attractive and compelling (Home Office, 2011: 5).
This focus on combating ideology could also be seen in Prime Minister David Cameron’s
2011 Munich speech (UK Government, 2011). More recently, it has carried through into the
2015 counter-extremism strategy. In a foreword to that strategy, Cameron spoke of defeating
a ‘poisonous ideology’ and the ‘scourge of extremism’ (Home Office, 2015: 6-7). The
strategy focused on Islamic State’s extremist narrative and the cultural threat this entails:

ISIL is a particularly grotesque manifestation of an extreme Islamist narrative, which
seeks to impose a new Islamic state governed by a harsh interpretation of Shari’a as
state law and totally rejects liberal values such as democracy, the rule of law and
equality (Home Office, 2015: 22).
The strategy discusses the threat from alternative systems of Sharia law, the rejection of
democracy, and controversial cultural practices like female genital mutilation (Home Office,
2015).
This combative language focusing on the ideological and cultural threat of terrorism
was toned down significantly in the most recent review of CONTEST (Home Office, 2018).
That document recognises the threat from right-wing extremism to a greater extent, and it
emphasizes the benefits of public-private partnerships and a multi-agency approach. The
Prevent strand returns to the idea of building community ‘resilience’ to extremism (Home
Office, 2018). However, the policy retains a focus on ideology as a ‘strong driver’ of
radicalisation and recognises other factors to a lesser extent (Home Office, 2018: 16). The
focus continues to be on the ideological threat from al-Qaeda and Islamic State. In addition,
the earlier Prevent and Counter-Extremism strategies remain current and relevant (Home
Office, 2011, 2015).
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Table 3. Dominant causes of radicalisation in CVE policy.
Country
United Kingdom

Dominant Explanations of Radicalisation
Ideological

Australia

Ideological
Social
Criminal (not supported)

Denmark

Psychological

Sweden

Ideological
Technological
Political

Netherlands

Psychological
Cultural (not supported)

None of these approaches is fundamentally inaccurate, and there are positive features –
but they differ in important ways and none implement the available research across the board.
The scholarly literature suggests that ideology and technology are not primary drivers of
radicalisation. The literature suggests that social networks and psychology are the most
influential, but these causes are under-represented in government policy. The Netherlands
draws a link between terrorism and a lack of integration which is not empirically supported
(Rahimi & Graumans, 2015). Australia draws a link to prior criminal behavior which is not
reflected in the literature. Overall, there is significant scope for improvement as to how
accurately and consistently these policies define the causes of radicalisation.
The clash of cultures described in UK policy is particularly problematic. It is
inconsistent with the scholarly literature, which suggests that psychological and social factors
have a greater impact (Guhl, 2018; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). More importantly, the rhetoric is
98
Keiran Hardy: Comparing Theories of Radicalisation with Countering Violent Extremism
Policy

dangerous because it reinforces the very idea – captured in the extremist worldview of
terrorist organisations – that the West is at war with Islam. It is no surprise, given this focus
on the ideological threat, that Prevent has suffered from criticism for its heavy focus on
Islamist terrorism and disproportionate focus on Muslim communities (Briggs, 2010; GithensMazer & Lambert, 2010; Kyriacou, Reed, Said, & Davies, 2017; Lakhani, 2012).
These results suggest two things, each requiring further investigation. First, the way
that a government explains radicalisation in its national policy can affect the design of its
CVE programs. A government which focuses on the ideological causes of radicalisation
(Home Office, 2011, 2015) is likely to invest more resources in counter-narratives, deradicalisation programs, and efforts to support ‘moderate’ Muslim leaders. A government
which focuses on the polarization of ethnic communities (Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations, 2007) is likely to devote more resources to improving integration. A
government which explains radicalisation by reference to criminal behavior and social bonds
(Australian Government, 2015) is likely to devote resources to disrupting terrorist groups, and
so on.
Second, the UK’s experience suggests that the way a government explains
radicalisation can impact on the success of its CVE programs. Explaining radicalisation
primarily by reference to extremist ideology is likely to create damaging perceptions that the
government is targeting Muslim communities.
There are many justifiable reasons why CVE policy differs across these countries.
Some of the variation can be explained by the lack of any definite answers as to how and why
radicalisation happens. Empirical research on radicalisation continues, but a true consensus is
unlikely to ever be reached. Other differences can be explained historically and politically.
Sweden’s national strategy, for example, focuses on right-wing extremism to a much greater
extent than any of the other policies (Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014. Given Sweden’s significant
experience with militant neo-Nazi groups (Bjørgo, 1993), this remains an appropriate strategy
for that context. It is unreasonable to expect that the other countries could simply replicate
Sweden’s approach without the same historical background.
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Other differences might be explained by different threat levels, whether a country has
experienced recent successful attacks, and contrasting approaches to integration. The UK’s
more combative response to extremist ideology, for example, might be explained by the series
of recent attacks in London and a ‘backlash’ against multiculturalism (Abass, 2007; Bertossi,
2011). In his Munich speech, David Cameron suggested that young men were turning to
terrorism because multiculturalism policy had led to a ‘weakening of our collective identity’
and an acceptance of segregation (UK Government, 2011). This suggests that CVE policy can
be shaped less by evidence-based research, and more so by local politics, history and culture.
At the same time, for the reasons explained in Part Four, it is reasonable to expect that
governments will draw on evidence-based research to the greatest extent available, and that
their explanations of radicalisation remain broadly consistent. There are no definite answers to
how or why people radicalise, but there are sufficient common themes to guide a consistent,
evidence-based approach. As it stands, more work is required to achieve this level of accuracy
and consistency.

VI. Conclusion

Radicalisation is a complex process with no easy explanations. In a basic sense, a person
radicalises where they adopt an extremist ideology and gradually move towards violent
action. Beyond this, there are no definite answers as to how and why people radicalise,
because the particular process and influences involved differ in each individual case. This
makes it difficult for governments to design national policy strategies for countering
extremism and radicalisation.
This article has analysed models and theories of radicalisation and assessed whether
this scholarly research is accurately reflected in Western CVE policy. Case studies of the UK,
Australia, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands suggest that national CVE policies
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adequately capture the core nature of radicalisation, but otherwise exhibit significant variation
in how they explain its causes.
While these countries accurately recognise multiple causes of radicalisation, they
choose to focus on one or more factors which they see as the primary driver. The primary
drivers of radicalisation are variously considered to be social, ideological, psychological, or
technological. More work is needed to ensure the accuracy and consistency of these causal
explanations against scholarly standards.
The UK is a notable outlier. Its Prevent strategy targets non-violent ideas and focuses
to the greatest extent on extremist ideology. This approach is not only inconsistent with the
scholarly literature, which suggests that psychological and social factors have a greater impact
(Guhl, 2018; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). It has also contributed to criticisms that Prevent work
impacts on free speech and further alienates Britain’s Muslim communities (Kyriacou et al.,
2017).
How a government explains radicalisation in its national policy strategies is not
merely semantic, and can have a significant impact on the design and success of its CVE
programs. A focus on ideological factors is likely to see greater investments in counternarratives, a focus on psychological factors is likely to see more counselling for young
people, and so on. There is a need to ensure that these explanations and the strategies used to
counter radicalisation are based in the available evidence. A heavy focus on ideology as the
primary driver of radicalisation is not only inaccurate; it is also likely to undermine the
success of CVE programs by aggravating perceptions that governments are targeting Muslim
communities with counter-terrorism powers.
Empirical evaluations of CVE programs are limited but growing in number (Feddes &
Gallucci, 2015; Mastroe, 2016; Zeiger & Aly, 2015). The current study suggests that deeper
comparative research is needed into CVE policy and how this impacts on the shape and
success of CVE programs on the ground. Comparing CVE policy and programs across
national borders remains an important task.
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